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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

JAN 28 1952

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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28 January 1952

SUBJECT: TERMS OF REFERENCE: NIE-27/1: CHINESE COMMUNIST  
CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions  
with respect to Taiwan through mid-1952.

ASSUMPTION

A truce has not been concluded in Korea.

QUESTIONS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

I. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST SITUATION

A. What Chinese Communist Forces are now in position to  
assault Taiwan?

1. Ground Forces

- a. Strength
- b. Disposition

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- c. Combat effectiveness (compared to Nationalist Ground Forces) with particular reference to specialized units such as amphibious and airborne units

2. Air Forces

- a. Strength
- b. Disposition
- c. Combat effectiveness (compared to Nationalist Air Forces and to US Air Forces likely to be employed against them in an assault on Taiwan)
- d. Airlift capabilities

3. Naval Forces

- a. Strength
- b. Disposition
- c. Combat effectiveness (compared to Nationalist Naval Forces and US Naval Forces likely to be employed against them in an assault on Taiwan)
- d. Waterlift capability

B. Under present circumstances (i.e., continuation of the war in Korea, present requirements for internal security, and present scale and nature of Chinese Communist commitment in Southeast Asia) what additional forces could the Chinese Communists make available for an assault on Taiwan?

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- C. What gaps are apparent in Chinese Communist capabilities?
  - 1. To what extent can and will the USSR compensate for these deficiencies?
- D. On the basis of points A, B, and C above, what would be the scale and nature of a maximum Chinese Communist effort within the next six months?
  - 1. Strength and composition
  - 2. Most feasible season for utilization of this force
  - 3. Capability for achieving surprise
  - 4. Capability for reinforcement and resupply
- E. What are Chinese Communist capabilities for infiltration of Taiwan prior to the assault?

## II. THE CHINESE NATIONALIST SITUATION

- A. What is the strength, disposition, composition, and combat effectiveness of the Nationalist Armed Forces?  
(Review contributions to SE-20)
- B. What are the factors in the political and economic situation on Taiwan that affect the capabilities of the Nationalist Armed Forces? How do these factors affect the Armed Forces?
- C. What is the scope and nature of the Chinese Communist subversive effort on Taiwan? How does this effort affect Nationalist capabilities to defend Taiwan?

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**III. PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS OF A CHINESE COMMUNIST ASSAULT ON TAIWAN**

- A. What are Nationalist capabilities to defend Taiwan?
  - 1. Against a maximum Chinese Communist effort as envisioned in I,D above?
  - 2. Against limited surprise attacks?
- B. What is the scope and nature of assistance the Nationalists would require for the successful defense of Taiwan?

**IV. HOW DO THE FOLLOWING FACTORS INFLUENCE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN?**

- A. Over-all Soviet policy
- B. Present US policy vis-a-vis Taiwan
- C. Possible US counter-action (e.g. attacks against mainland targets)
- D. The Korean situation
  - 1. Tactical
  - 2. Truce Negotiations
- E. Possible reactions in non-Communist areas in the Far East

**V. WHAT ARE THE INDICATIONS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN?**

- A. Military Preparations
- B. Domestic Propaganda

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C. Foreign Propaganda

D. UN Negotiations

E. Other

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VI. WHAT ARE CHINESE COMMUNIST INTENTIONS WITH RESPECT TO TAIWAN?

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